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Introduction 
 
 The Open Society Justice Initiative (the “Justice Initiative”) as amicus curiae respectfully 
submits this brief to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the “Court”) in accordance with 
Article 26 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure.  
This case concerns issues of great significance for the development and application of 
legal norms concerning racial discrimination1 in the enjoyment of the right to a nationality.2 
Racial discrimination in access to nationality is widespread in the Dominican Republic, and in 
other parts of the world, even though it is prohibited by international and regional human rights 
norms. Nonetheless, so far as we have determined, this is the first case which squarely presents 
the issue for resolution by an international or regional court. The first section of this submission 
reviews prevailing standards and jurisprudence on direct and indirect forms of racial 
discrimination, describes the origins and contours of the right to a nationality as an international 
human right, and draws upon international and comparative legal authority in explaining how the 
prohibition against racial discrimination limits states’ discretion in the granting or denying of 
nationality. The second section demonstrates that racial discrimination in access to nationality 
takes place systematically in the Dominican Republic. The final section analyzes several 
examples of racial discrimination from different countries to illustrate that this problem is of 
global scope. Accordingly, the Court’s judgment in this case can make a major contribution to the 
development of international jurisprudence and the amelioration of grave human rights violations, 
both in the Dominican Republic and more generally.   
 
Statement of Interest 
 The Justice Initiative pursues law reform activities grounded in the protection of human 
rights, and contributes to the development of legal capacity for open societies. It has offices in 
New York (United States), Budapest (Hungary), and Abuja (Nigeria). Among its activities, the 
Justice Initiative prepares legal submissions for national and international courts and tribunals on 
questions of law where its expertise may be of assistance.  
                                                 
1 The term “racial discrimination” is used herein as defined in Article 1 of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (the “Race Convention”) to mean “any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.” 
2 In this submission, the term “nationality” follows the definition employed by this Court as “the political and legal 
bond that links a person to a given state and binds him to it with ties of loyalty and fidelity, entitling him to diplomatic 
protection from that state.” Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Judgment of May 30, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 
52 (1999), para. 99; Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Judgment of February 6, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 
74, para. 91; Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory 
Opinion OC-4/84, January 19, 1984, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984), para. 35.  See also European 
Convention on Nationality, Article 2 (nationality is “the legal bond between a person and a State”).  
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Racial equality and non-discriminatory access to nationality are among our core thematic 
concerns. As an organization that promotes equality before the law and nationality policies in 
accordance with international human rights norms, the Justice Initiative has a particular interest in 
the questions raised by this matter. 
The Justice Initiative has been involved in standard-setting in this field at the 
international level, including through advocacy and information-dissemination before United 
Nations bodies. The Justice Initiative prepared a written submission and convened meetings of 
interested advocates in preparation for the thematic session on discrimination against non-citizens 
of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, held in Geneva in 
March 2004. In October 2004, the Justice Initiative provided expert assistance to the deliberations 
of the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the 
common intersections between racial discrimination and statelessness. We are currently engaged 
in work in Africa, Asia and Europe on documentation and litigation aimed at identifying and 
combating problems facing minorities in accessing, and retaining, nationality.  
Drawing on our expertise, the Justice Initiative has prepared this brief to provide the 
Court with comparative legal standards and practical information from a variety of jurisdictions 
concerning racial discrimination and access to nationality.  
 
Statement of Facts 
 In light of other submissions in this case, this brief will not repeat the facts in detail but 
provides the following summary of pertinent facts.3 Dilcia Yean and Violeta Bosico, two girls, 
both minors, born in the Dominican Republic to Dominican women of Haitian descent, were 
denied Dominican nationality in spite of the fact that both were born within the territory of the 
Dominican Republic and that the Constitution establishes the principle of jus solis. Refused 
permission to register their births, the girls were unable to obtain recognition of their legal 
personality, could not enroll in school because they had no identity documents, and, as 
undocumented persons, remained vulnerable to expulsion from the country. The petition in this 
case—filed October 28, 1998 before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (the 
“Inter-American Commission”)—argued, inter alia, that the girls were deprived of access to 
nationality because of their race and their Haitian descent. Specifically, petitioners claimed that 
the offices in charge of processing birth registrations refused to register the girls, saying they had 
orders not to register or issue birth certificates to children of Haitian descent. The official in 
charge of the Civil Registry explained that the girls had been born to Haitian parents who were in 
                                                 
3 This summary is based upon Report of Admissibility No. 28/01 Case No. 12.189, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (22 February 
2001).    
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the country illegally. The girls thus had no right to Dominican citizenship. According to 
petitioners, the statutory requirements for belated declarations of birth indirectly discriminate 
against ethnic Haitians. The government denied these allegations. On November 22, 1999, the 
government accepted the Inter-American Commission’s offer to help the parties reach a friendly 
solution. These efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. On February 22, 2001, the Inter-American 
Commission declared the case admissible with regard to the alleged violation of the right to 
nationality set forth in Article 20 of the American Convention on Human Rights.  
 
Discussion 
 
I.  Racial Discrimination in Access to Nationality Violates Articles 1(1) and 24, 
Taken Together with Article 20(1) of the American Convention of Human 
Rights, and Other Provisions of International Law  
 
A. Racial Discrimination in International Law 
 
1. The Prohibition against Racial Discrimination is a Jus Cogens Norm 
 As numerous courts have explained, racial discrimination is a particular evil which 
international and comparative law accords high priority to combating and redressing.4 
Recognized in all major international and regional human rights instruments,5 the prohibition of 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finding that racial segregation in public education 
violated equal protection clause of Article 14 of U.S. Constitution and noting the particularly “detrimental effect” on 
minority children); East African Asians v. United Kingdom, 3 EHRR 76 (1973), para. 207 (holding that immigration 
legislation which singled out for exclusion a particular racial group constituted “degrading treatment” under the 
European Convention of Human Rights and noting that “a special importance should be attached to discrimination 
based on race”).  
5 Article 1(3) of the United Nations Charter includes among the purposes of the United Nations “promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction to race, sex, language or 
religion…” Article 55(c) of the Charter commits the United Nations to promote non-discrimination. Article 2 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the 
political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be 
independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty”; Article 7 holds, “All are equal 
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal 
protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such 
discrimination.” See also the  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Articles 2 (“Each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”) and 26 (“All 
persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this 
respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth, or other status”); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), Article 2(2) (“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in 
the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
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racial discrimination is a rule of customary international law6 and has become a jus cogens, or 
peremptory, norm.7 This Court has so affirmed:  
[T]he principle of equality before the law, equal protection before 
the law and non-discrimination belongs to jus cogens, because the 
whole legal structure of national and international public order rests 
on it and it is a fundamental principle that permeates all laws. 
Nowadays, no legal act that is in conflict with this fundamental 
principle is acceptable, and discriminatory treatment of any person, 
owing to gender, race, color, language, religion or belief, political or 
other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, nationality, age, 
economic situation, property, civil status, birth or any other status is 
unacceptable. This principle (equality and non-discrimination) 
forms part of general international law. At the existing stage of the 
development of international law, the fundamental principle of 
equality and non-discrimination has entered the realm of jus 
cogens.8 
                                                                                                                                                 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”); the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR), Article 14 (“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”). Article 1 of Protocol No. 
12 to the ECHR, entered into force on April 1, 2005, holds that “[t]he enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”; Article 2 holds that “No 
one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1.” 
Article 21 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights holds that “Any discrimination based on any ground such as 
sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited”. See also 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), Chapter 1, Article 2 (“Every individual shall be entitled 
to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any 
kind such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, 
fortune, birth or other status”); the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), Articles 1(1) (“The States Parties 
to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject 
to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of 
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any 
other social condition”) and 24 (“All persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without 
discrimination, to equal protection of the law”). 
6 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) The Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), Sec. 702 (“Customary 
International Law of Human Rights: A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, 
encourages, or condones … systematic racial discrimination”). In a recent decision, R  v. Immigration Officer at 
Prague Airport, UKHL 55 (2004), the House of Lords, the supreme judicial body in the United Kingdom, detailed the 
evolution of the prohibition of racial and ethnic discrimination into a rule of international customary law: “The great 
theme which runs through subsequent human rights instruments, national, regional and international, is the legal right 
of equality with the correlative right of non-discrimination on the grounds of race…State practice virtually universally 
condemns discrimination on grounds of race. It does so in recognition of the fact that it has become unlawful in 
international law to discriminate on the grounds of race. It is true that in the world, as we know it, departures from this 
norm are only too many. But the international community has signed up to it. The moral norm has ripened into a rule of 
customary international law. It is binding on all states” (para. 46). 
7 See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States at the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 ICJ Rep. 3, at 57, para. 131 (advisory opinion); South 
West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) 1966 ICJ Rep. 4, at 290, 293 (Tanaka, J., 
dissenting); Restatement (Third) The Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), Sec. 702, comment (n). 
According to Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a peremptory norm of general 
international law is “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international 
law having the same character.” In addition to the prohibition of racial discrimination, the other peremptory norms of 
international law include the prohibitions against slavery, murder and disappearance, torture and prolonged arbitrary 
detention, and genocide.  
8 Juridical Conditions and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 of September 17, 2003, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 18 (2003), para. 101.  
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This Court has made clear that both Articles 1(1) and 24 of the American Convention are relevant 
to a claim of discrimination.9  
 Discrimination on the grounds of national origin is a form of racial discrimination 
which is equally impermissible under international and comparative law. The CERD has 
made this clear in its concluding observations with respect to the Dominican Republic10 and more 
                                                 
9 Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, 
January 19, 1984, supra note 2, para. 54.   
10UN CERD, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Dominican 
Republic 26/08/99, UN Doc. CERD/304/Add.74, para. 11 (recommending that government adopt urgent measures to 
ensure the enjoyment by “persons of Haitian origin” of their economic, social and cultural rights without 
discrimination). 
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generally.11 Other UN treaty bodies are in accord,12 as are national legislation and 
jurisprudence. 13 
                                                 
11 The CERD has repeatedly reaffirmed that discrimination on the basis of national origin constitutes one form of 
prohibited racial discrimination under Article 1 of the Convention. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Uganda 02/06/2003, UN Doc. CERD/C/62/CO/11, para. 10 
(regretting that legislative measures and judicial mechanisms in place to ensure the return of the property to “persons of 
Asian origin” had not been fully implemented); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination: Croatia 21/05/2002, UN Doc. CERD/C/60/CO/4, para. 14 (“[c]oncern is expressed that many 
former long term residents of Croatia, particularly persons of Serb origin and other minorities, have been unable to 
regain residency status despite their pre-conflict attachment to Croatia”); ibid., para. 15 (expressing concern that, in the 
area of property claims, the courts reportedly continue to favor “persons of Croat origin”); Concluding Observations of 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Costa Rica 20/03/2002, UN Doc. CERD/C/60/CO/3, para. 
15 (recommending that the State party continue its efforts to ensure the rights of the immigrant population as regards 
“discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnic or national origin); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Republic of Moldova 21/05/2002, UN Doc. CERD/C/60/CO/9, para. 15 
(recommending that a parliamentary inquiry into the alleged existence of terrorists among “students of Arabic origin” 
should avoid “any suspicion of racial profiling”); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination: Poland 21/03/2003, UN Doc. CERD/C/62/CO/6, para. 10 (expressing concern about reports of 
racially motivated harassment and discrimination against, inter alia, “persons of African and Asian origin”); 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Malawi 10/12/2003, UN Doc. 
CERD/C/63/CO/12, para. 8 (expressing concern that the registration of birth is not compulsory, except for “children of 
non-African origin”); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Finland. 
28/03/96, UN Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.7, para. 28 (urging the State party that “[a]ppropriate action should be taken to 
ensure that access to places or services intended for use by the general public is not denied on grounds of national or 
ethnic origin, contrary to Article 5(f) of the Convention”); and Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 28/03/96, UN Doc. 
CERD/C/304/Add.9, para. 238 (expressing concern that the British citizenship granted to South Asian residents of 
Hong Kong “does not grant the bearer the right of abode in the United Kingdom and contrasts with the full citizenship 
status conferred upon a predominantly white population living in another dependent territory. It is noted that most of 
the persons holding BNO or BOC status are Asians and that judgments on applications for citizenship appear to vary 
according to the country of origin, which leads to the assumption that this practice reveals elements of racial 
discrimination”).  
12 See, e.g., UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Sweden 
24/04/2002, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE, para.12 (expressing concern regarding the effect of anti-terrorism campaign 
on the situation of human rights in Sweden, in particular for “persons of foreign extraction”); Concluding Observations 
of the Human Rights Committee: Ireland 03/08/93, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.21, para. 17 (expressing concern about 
discriminatory distinctions between citizens by birth and those who are naturalized and the discriminatory treatment in 
some respects of non-nationals, including refugees and asylum-seekers). See also Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Iceland 31/01/2003, UN Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.203, para.22 (welcoming government efforts to address the needs of “people of foreign origin”). See 
also UN Human Rights Committee, Gueye et. al. v. France, Communication No. 196/1983, UN Doc. A/44/40 at 189 
(“[u]nder Article 26, discrimination in the equal protection of the law is prohibited on any grounds such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”). 
13 In the United States, for example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended), 42 U.S.C. Section 2000a, prohibits 
discrimination based on “race, color, religion or national origin” in public establishments that have a connection to 
interstate commerce or are supported by the state. The US Department of Justice has issued a widely-distributed 
brochure titled Federal Protections against National Origin Discrimination (October 2000), which provides: “Federal 
laws prohibit discrimination based on a person's national origin, race, color, religion, disability, sex, and familial status. 
Laws prohibiting national origin discrimination make it illegal to discriminate because of a person's birthplace, 
ancestry, culture or language....” See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (classifications based 
on national origin, like those based on race, are suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny). In the United Kingdom, 
Section 1 of the Race Relations Act of 1976 provides that a person discriminates against another in any circumstances 
relevant for the purposes of any provision of the Act if “... (a) on racial grounds he treats that other less favourably than 
he treats or would treat other persons….” Section 3(1) of the Act defines “racial grounds” as “any of the following 
grounds, namely colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins….” The Australian Racial Discrimination Act of 
1975 makes it unlawful “for a person to do any act involving a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on 
race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of any human right or fundamental freedom in the political, 
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life” (Section II, Part 9). Canada’s Human Rights Act 1985 lists 
the prohibited grounds of discrimination as “race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual 
orientation, marital status, family status, disability and conviction for which a pardon has been granted” (Part I, 3[a]). 
In Spain, Article 510.1 of the Penal Code penalizes “those who provoke discrimination, hatred, or violence against 
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2. Both Direct Discrimination and Indirect Discrimination are Unlawful 
 Direct discrimination is less favorable treatment on the basis of prohibited grounds such 
as race. Indirect discrimination—also known as “de facto discrimination” or “disparate/adverse 
impact or effect”—occurs when a practice, rule, requirement or condition is neutral on its face but 
impacts particular groups disproportionately, absent objective and reasonable justification.  
 International law prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination. The Race Convention 
terms as “racial discrimination” all specified actions which have “the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.”14 A similar approach has been adopted by Europe’s regional 
organs.15  
 Articles 1(1) and 24 of the American Convention explicitly prohibit direct 
discrimination.16 This Court has held that they also bar indirect discrimination. Thus, “States must 
abstain from carrying out any action that, in any way, directly or indirectly, is aimed at creating 
situations of de jure or de facto discrimination.”17  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
groups of associations for racist, anti-Semitic or other reasons relating to their religion or beliefs, family situation, 
membership of an ethnic group or race, national origin, sexual orientation or illness or disability. In Belgium, the Law 
of 30 July 1981 against racism punishes discrimination inspired by specific motives, among them “race, color, descent, 
origin, or nationality. In Portugal, Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees protection against discrimination “by reason 
of [the victim’s] ancestry, sex, race, language, territory of origin, religion or ideological convictions, education, 
economic situation or social circumstances.” In the Netherlands, the Criminal Code’s prohibition of racial 
discrimination interprets the term “race” to include ethnic and national origin, descent, and colour. See Marcel 
Zwamborn, Executive Summary, Discrimination Based on Racial or Ethnic Origin: The Netherlands [prepared for the 
European Union/European Commission on 10 June 2004], at 2).  
14 Race Convention, Article 1(1) (emphasis added). See CERD, General Recommendation 14: Definition of 
Discrimination (Art. 1, par.1) 22/03/93 (1993), para. 1 (“A distinction is contrary to the Convention if it has either the 
purpose or effect of impairing particular rights and freedoms”); L.R. v. Slovak Republic, Communication No. 31/2003, 
(CERD Views of 10 March 2005), UN Doc. CERD/C/66/D/31/2003 para. 10.4 (“the definition of racial discrimination 
in article 1 [of the Race Convention] expressly extends beyond measures which are explicitly discriminatory, to 
encompass measures which are not discriminatory at face value but are discriminatory in fact and effect, that is, if they 
amount to indirect discrimination”). See also UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-
Discrimination 10/11/89 (1989) (using similar language to interpret “discrimination” under Articles 2 and 26 of the 
ICCPR). This test has been applied in decisions of the UN Human Rights Committee in respect of individual 
complaints. See, e.g., Althammer v. Austria, Communication No. 998/2001, UN Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/998/2001, para. 
10.2; and Simunek et al v. Czech Republic, Communication No. 516/1992, UN Doc. CCPR/C/54/D/516/1992, para. 
11.7.  
15 European Union, Council Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
racial or ethnic origin 2000/43 (“EU Race Directive”), Article 2(2).  See also the Belgian Linguistics Case, 1 EHRR 
252 (1968), para. 10 (the existence of an objective and reasonable justification for distinction at issue “must be assessed 
in relation to the aim and effects of the measure under consideration”).  
16 The Inter-American Commission has expressly held that “[s]tatutory distinctions based on such criteria, such as, for 
example, race or sex…necessarily give rise to heightened scrutiny” in Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, 
Report Nº 4/00 Case 11.625, Inter. Am. C.H.R. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.111 Doc. 20 rev. at 929 (2000), para. 36.  
17 Juridical Conditions and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 of September 17, 2003, 
supra note 8, para. 103.   
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3. Proving Indirect Discrimination18 
 The concept of indirect discrimination has been elaborated in other jurisdictions. In the 
case of Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held, “Where a 
general policy or measure has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group, it is not 
excluded that this may be considered as discriminatory notwithstanding that it is not specifically 
aimed or directed at the group.”19 Similarly, Article 2(b) of the European Union’s Directive 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin (“EU Race Directive”), provides that “[i]ndirect discrimination shall be taken to occur 
when an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons or a racial or ethnic 
origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or 
practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary.” 
 In general, indirect discrimination claims have two principal components. First, the 
complainant must establish a prima facie case of indirect discrimination—a showing that 
application of the rule at issue has produced disproportionately negative effects for members of a 
particular group. Second, in many jurisdictions,20 once a prima facie case is made out, the burden 
of proof shifts to the defendant to show either (a) that there is in fact no discriminatory impact, or 
(b) that the discriminatory impact is objectively and reasonably justified.  Once the burden of 
proof shifts, the court must ascertain whether the evidence adduced by the defendant is adequate 
to rebut the factual presumption of discrimination drawn from the prima facie case of the 
complainant.  If it does not, the court is to consider discrimination as having been proven.   
 As numerous courts have noted, discrimination is often difficult to prove. In cases of 
indirect discrimination, the evidence necessary to demonstrate disparate impact is often not in the 
                                                 
18 The discussion on indirect discrimination draws, among other sources, upon Interights, Non-Discrimination in 
International Law: A Handbook for Practitioners (2005) (available at www.interights.org); and Interights, Written 
Comments of INTERIGHTS in the case of Nachova v. Bulgaria (43577/98) (European Court of Human Rights (2004).  
19 Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom (24746/94), [2001] ECHR 323 (4 May 2001), para. 154. See also Thlimmenos v. 
Greece (34369/97), [2000] ECHR 161 (6 April 2000), para. 44 (“The right not to be discriminated against in the 
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is also violated when States without an objective and 
reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different”).   
20 For the United Nations organs, see: UN Human Rights Committee, Chedi Ben Ahmed Karoui v. Sweden, 
Communication No. 185/2001, U.N. Doc. A/57/44 at 198 (2002), para. 10 (“substantive reliable documentation” will 
shift the burden of proof to the Respondent State); UN CERD, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 10/12/2003, U.N. 
Doc. CERD/C/63/CO/11 (2003), para. 4. For the European Court of Justice, see Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. 
Weber Von Hartz, 1986 E.C.R. 1607, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 701 (1986), para. 31; Case C-33/89 Maria Kowalska v. Freie und 
Hansestadt Hamburg, [1990] ECR I-2591, para. 16;  and C-184/89 Nimz v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [1991] ECR I297, para. 15; Case C-109/88 
Handels-og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark v. Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Danfoss, 
[1989] ECR 3199 [1989], para. 16. For the European Court of Human Rights, see Nachova v. Bulgaria (43577/98) 
ECHR 89 (26 February 2004) (pending decision of the Grand Chamber). For a number of national jurisdictions, see, for 
example,  the Netherlands (RK Woningbouwvereniging Binderen v. S. Kaya, 10 December 1982, NJ 1983/687); Canadian Human Rights Act, section 15; Canada (British 
Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles)) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 868 [Grismer], at para. 20; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 492 (1973). See also South African Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 2000, section 13 and section 54A; New Zealand Human 
Rights Act 1993, section 92F; United States Civil Rights Act 1991, section 105(a).  
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control of the complainant(s). Accordingly, several jurisdictions have devised methods to 
compensate for the particular complexities of proof in cases of indirect discrimination.21  
 A number of courts have held that evidence of “a general picture” of disadvantage or 
“common knowledge” of discrimination might be sufficient to constitute a prima facie case.22 In 
reviewing individual communications, the UN CERD has noted that, “[i]n assessing … indirect 
discrimination, the Committee must take full account of the particular context and circumstances 
of the petition, as by definition indirect discrimination can only be demonstrated 
circumstantially.”23 In New Zealand, courts have found discrimination on the basis of “judicial 
notice,” where, it is reasoned, a fact “is so generally known that every ordinary person may be 
reasonably presumed to be aware of it.”24 The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he burden of 
establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.”25 In the United Kingdom, 
courts have held that the unavailability of direct evidence of discrimination in most cases 
warrants the drawing of reasonable inferences from facts.26 Inferences are particularly important 
in the context of combating “institutional” or “systemic” discrimination,27  where a discriminator 
may be unaware of his or her own prejudices, and is merely acting in accordance with a 
framework of entrenched societal bias.  It is well established that a victim’s race need not be 
shown to be the only or even the main reason for the less favorable treatment; it is sufficient if it 
had a “significant influence on the outcome.”28   
 Intent to discriminate is irrelevant to a finding of discrimination.29 In Griggs v. Duke 
Power Company,30 the first case to set forth the concept of indirect discrimination, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reasoned: “[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem … 
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are 
unrelated to measuring … capability.”31 Although discriminatory intent is a requirement of 
                                                 
21 This tendency is in accord with this Court’s observations that international human rights courts particularly should “enjoy substantial flexibility 
in the assessment of evidence submitted to them regarding the respective facts, to establish the international responsibility of a State, in accordance with the rules and logic and 
based on experience.” Bulacio v. Argentina, Judgment of September 18, 2003, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 100 (2003), para. 4.  See also Nachova v. Bulgaria, 
supra note 20, para. 168 (“it has become an established view in Europe that effective implementation of the prohibition 
of discrimination requires the use of specific measures that take into account the difficulties involved in proving 
discrimination”). 
22 See, from the United Kingdom, London Underground v. Edwards (No. 2) 1999 ICR 494 CA (1999); and from 
Australia, Mayer v. Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation EOC 93-285 (2003).  
23 L.R. v. Slovak Republic, Communication No. 31/2003, (CERD Views of 10 March 2005), supra note 14, para. 10.4. 
24 Auckland City Council v. Hapimana [1976] 1 NZLR 731, at 733; Northern Regional Health Authority v. Human 
Rights Commission [1998] 2 NZLR 218, at 242.  
25 Texas Dept. of Community. Affairs v. Burdine 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). See also Canada (Human Rights 
Commission) v. Canada (Department of National Health and Welfare) 4 F.C. D 7 (1998).  
26 See Anya v. Oxford University  EWCA Civ 405 (2001), para. 9. 
27 The Canadian Supreme Court discussed this phenomenon at length in British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia (Government 
and Service Employees' Union), 3 S.C.R. 3] (1999), para. 41.  
28 Nagarajan v. London Regional Transport [1998] IRLR 73 [House of Lords], 76, para 13, n. 8, per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead at 513B.   
29 Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, supra note 19, para. 154;  Nachova v. Bulgaria, supra note 20, para. 167.   
30Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.  401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
31 Ibid at 432.  
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constitutional equal protection claims in the United States,32 most other jurisdictions continue to 
follow the Griggs approach.33 
 With respect to the notion of justification, this Court has held that “there would be no 
discrimination in differences of treatment of individuals by a state when the classifications 
selected are based on substantial factual differences and there exists a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between these differences and the aims of the legal rule under review.”34 Other 
jurisdictions, including United Nations treaty bodies,35 the European Court of Justice36 and the 
European Court of Human Rights,37 use similar tests. The EU Race Directive provides that prima 
facie discriminatory measures can be justified by a pursuit of a “legitimate aim” where the means 
of achieving this aim are “appropriate and necessary.”38   
 
B. The Right to Nationality as an International Human Right   
 Since the rise of the nation-state in the 18th and 19th centuries, the right to a nationality 
has, in practice, become integral to the enjoyment of almost all other rights. As the Inter-
American Commission itself has explained:  
[Nationality] is one of the most important rights of man, after the 
right to life itself, because all other prerogative guarantees and 
benefits man derives from his membership in a political and social 
community – the States – stem from or are supported by this right.39 
 
                                                 
32 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
33 Among United Nations organs, see, e.g., the UN Human Rights Committee, Brooks v. The Netherlands 
Communication No. 172/1984, UN Doc. CCPR/C/29/D/172/1984, paras. 12.3 - 16 (finding violation of ICCPR Article 
26 on grounds of sex discrimination, even though State party had not intended to discriminate against women); 
Simunek et al. v. Czech Republic, supra note 14, para. 11.7 (“the intent of the legislature is not alone dispositive in 
determining a breach of article 26 of the Covenant. A politically motivated differentiation is unlikely to be compatible 
with article 26. But an act which is not politically motivated may still contravene article 26 if its effects are 
discriminatory”); Althammer v. Austria, supra note 14, para. 10.2 (employing similar reasoning); UN CERD, General 
Recommendation No. 19: Racial segregation and apartheid (Art. 3) 18/08/95, para. 3 (“condition of [unlawful] partial 
segregation may also arise as an unintended by-product of the actions of private persons”). The principle is well-
established in Europe as well. See Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, supra note 19, para. 154. 
34 Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/94, 
supra note 2, para. 57.  
35 See UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-Discrimination 10/11/89, supra note 14, para. 13 
(“not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are 
reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant”); UN CERD, 
General Recommendation 14: Definition of Discrimination (Art. 1, par. 1), supra note 14, para. 2 (“A differentiation of 
treatment will not constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged against the objectives and 
purposes of the Convention, are legitimate or fall within the scope of article 1, paragraph 4, of the Convention”).  
36 Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Weber Von Hartz, , supra note 20, para. 36 (measures at issue must “correspond to a real 
need on the part of the undertaking, [and] are appropriate with a view to achieving the objectives pursued and are 
necessary to that end”).   
37 Numerous European Court judgments have reaffirmed the standard originally elaborated in the Belgian Linguistics 
Case, supra note 15, para. 10:  “A difference of treatment in the exercise of a right laid down in the Convention must 
not only pursue a legitimate aim: Article 14 … is likewise violated when it is clearly established that there is no 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized.”  
38 Article 2(2)(b). 
39 Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, “Chapter 
IX: ‘Right to Nationality,’” Inter-Am. C.H.R. OEA/Ser.L/V/II/40 Doc 10, February 1977, para. 10.  
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 International law has traditionally afforded states broad discretion to define the contours 
of and delimit access to nationality. Nonetheless, due in large part to the visceral link between the 
right to a nationality and the enjoyment of other fundamental human rights, emerging 
international and comparative legal norms and jurisprudence make clear that nationality laws and 
practices must be consistent with the principles of international law. In 1923, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice ruled that in the context of state allocation of nationality, “[t]he 
question of whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a States 
is an essentially relevant question; it depends on the development of international relations.”40 
Along similar lines, Article 1 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the 
Conflict of Nationality Laws decreed that 
It is for each State to determine under its own laws who are its 
nationals. This law shall be recognized by other States in so far as it 
is consistent with international conventions, international custom, 
and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to 
nationality.41 
 
 In the decades after World War II, the right to nationality gained wider recognition in 
regional and international instruments. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights makes 
clear that “[e]very one has a right to a nationality” and that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.”42 The European Convention on 
Nationality is in accord.43 The American Convention on Human Rights affirms the general right 
to nationality and the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation, and adds that “[e]very person has 
the right to the nationality of the state in whose territory he was born if he does not have the right 
to any other nationality.”44  
 International law places particular emphasis on the right to a nationality enjoyed by 
children. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affirms the right of every child 
to acquire a nationality.45 The Convention on the Rights of the Child imposes quite specific 
obligations on States in this field: “The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall 
have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality, and, as far as possible, the 
right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.”46 Furthermore, “States Parties shall 
undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, 
                                                 
40 Nationality decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco-Advisory opinion [1922] PCIJ 3 (4 October 1922), para. 24.  
41 1930 Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws 179 LNTS 80; 1930 Can. T.S. No. 7.  
42 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 15.  
43 Article 4 provides, “(a) Everyone has a right to a nationality; (b) statelessness should be avoided; (c) no one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality.” 
44 Article 20.  
45 ICCPR, Article 24(3).  
46 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 7(1). 
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name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful interference.”47 The Committee 
on the Rights of the Child has noted that the failure to register children’s birth “implies the non-
recognition of these children as persons before the law, which will affect the level of enjoyment 
of their fundamental rights and freedoms.”48 These requirements reflect the well-settled principle 
that nationality must not only be accessible as a matter of law; it must be capable of being readily 
established as a matter of practice. Multiple international human rights organs have recognized 
that prompt registration of birth is essential to enable data and place of birth to be conclusively 
established, thereby activating certain rights, including those which are dependent on nationality 
and personality status.49 
 In its commentary to the Preamble to the 1997 Draft Articles on the Nationality of 
Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States adopted at its 51st Session in 1999, the 
International Law Commission characterized the change in the international legal status of 
nationality as follows: “[A]lthough nationality is essentially governed by national legislation, the 
                                                 
47  Ibid., Article 8(1).  
48 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: 
Madagascar 24/10/94, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.26, para.10.  
49 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protection and Care (1994), at 
103-104. See also UNICEF, Birth Registration Right From the Start, Innocenti Digest No. 9 (March 2002), at 4 (“Birth 
registration establishes the child’s identity and is generally a prerequisite for issuing a birth certificate. A fully 
registered birth and the accompanying birth certificate help a child secure the right to his or her origins, to a nationality, 
and also help to safeguard other human rights);  UNICEF, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (2002), at 108 (“The child’s right to be ‘registered immediately after birth’: The importance of universal 
registration: … [R]egistration is the State’s first official acknowledgement of the child’s existence; it represents a 
recognition of each child’s individual importance to the State and of the child’s status under the law. Where children 
are not registered, they are less likely to be visible, and sometimes less valued citizens”); ibid., at 111 (“According to 
the Convention, the child should be registered ‘immediately after birth’ which implies a defined period of days rather 
than months”). See also Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child: Senegal 27/11/95, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.44, para. 22 (“The Committee suggests that special 
efforts be developed to ensure an effective system of birth registration, in the light of Article 7, to ensure the enjoyment 
of the fundamental rights of the Convention by all children without discrimination and as a meaningful tool to assess 
prevailing difficulties and to promote progress”); and Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child: Ethiopia. 24/01/97, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.67, para. 29 (“The Committee recommends that special efforts be 
developed to guarantee an effective system of birth registration, in the light of article 7 of the Convention, to ensure the 
full enjoyment of their fundamental rights by all children”) UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 17: 
Article 24 (Thirty-fifth session, 1989), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 23, para. 7 (“Under article 24, paragraph 2, every child 
has the right to be registered immediately after birth and to have a name. In the Committee's opinion, this provision 
should be interpreted as being closely linked to the provision concerning the right to special measures of protection and 
it is designed to promote recognition of the child's legal personality”); ibid., para. 8 (“[s]tates are required to adopt 
every appropriate measure, both internally and in cooperation with other States, to ensure that every child has a 
nationality when he is born”). The Committee on the Rights of the Child has repeatedly underscored the key role 
played by birth registration and issuance of birth certificates in accessing the right to nationality. See, for example, 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Bhutan 09/07/2001, UN Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.157, para. 34 (“the Committee is concerned that the failure of timely birth registration can have 
negative consequences on the full enjoyment by children of their fundamental rights and freedoms,” including the right 
to nationality). In its General Comment No. 3: HIV/AIDS and the Child,  the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
further emphasized the importance of birth registration and related human rights: “The Committee wishes to emphasize 
the critical implications of proof of identity for children… as it relates to securing recognition as a person before the 
law, safeguarding the protection of rights, in particular to inheritance, education, health and other social services, as 
well as to making children less vulnerable to abuse and exploitation… In this respect, birth registration is critical to 
ensuring the rights of the child… States parties are, therefore, reminded of their obligation under article 7 of the 
Convention to ensure that systems are in place for the registration of every child at or immediately after birth” (para. 
32). 
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competence of States in this field may be exercised only within the limits set by international 
law…. As a result of this evolution in the field of human rights, the traditional approach based on 
the preponderance of the interests of States over the interests of individuals has subsided.”50 
Article 3(1) of the  European Convention on Nationality similarly states that “[t]his law shall be 
accepted by other States in so far as it is consistent with applicable international conventions, 
customary international law and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to 
nationality.”  
 The growing recognition of a right to nationality at international level has been reflected 
in the jurisprudence of this Court. In 1984, affirming that “[n]ationality is an inherent right of all 
human beings,”51 this Court explained the evolution of international law: 
The classical doctrinal position, which viewed nationality as an 
attribute granted by the State to its subjects, has gradually evolved 
to the point that nationality today is perceived as involving the 
jurisdiction of the State as well as human rights issues52…. [I]n 
order to arrive at a satisfactory interpretation of the right to 
nationality, as embodied in Article 20 of the Convention, it will be 
necessary to reconcile the principle that the conferral and regulation 
of nationality fall within the jurisdiction of the state, that is, they are 
matters to be determined by the domestic law of the state, with the 
further principle that international law imposes certain limits on the 
state's power, which limits are linked to the demands imposed by 
the international system for the protection of human 
rights53….[D]espite the fact that it is traditionally accepted that the 
conferral and regulation of nationality are matters for each state to 
decide, contemporary developments indicate that international law 
does impose certain limits on the broad powers enjoyed by states in 
that area, and that the manner in which states regulate matters 
bearing on nationality cannot today be deemed within their sole 
jurisdiction; those powers of the state are also circumscribed by 
their obligations to ensure the full protection of human rights.54 
 
More recently, the Court again affirmed that “[t]he right to nationality is recognized by 
international law. This Court considers that it is a right of the individual…. [I]nternational law 
imposes certain limits on a State’s discretionality and … in the regulation of nationality, it is not 
only the competence of States, but also the requirements of the integral protection of human 
rights that intervene.”55 
 
                                                 
50 International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-first session 3 
May-23 July 1999 (A/54/10), “Chapter IV: Nationality in Relation to the Succession of States,” Commentary [3], 
Commentary [5] on the Preamble.   
51Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, 
supra note 2, para. 32.   
52 Ibid.   
53 Ibid., para. 38.  
54 Ibid., para. 37.  
55 Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, supra note 2, paras. 86, 88.   
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C.  International and Comparative Law Bars States from Refusing to Grant Nationality 
on the Basis of Race  
 One of the principal constraints on state discretion to grant or deny nationality is the 
proscription against racial discrimination. This principle is reflected in international treaties, the 
conclusions of international and regional monitoring bodies, and comparative national legislation 
outlawing discrimination in access to nationality on the grounds of race, ethnicity, and/or national 
origin. 
 Reflecting the state of international law more generally, the Race Convention affords 
States considerable latitude to adopt legislation “concerning nationality, citizenship or 
naturalization.”56 However, the realm of State discretion in the field of nationality has an outer 
limit—the prohibition against racial discrimination. Accordingly, the Convention prohibits States 
from “discriminat[ing] against any particular nationality.”57 More affirmatively, it obliges States 
to “guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic 
origin, to equality before the law, in the enjoyment of … the right to nationality.”58 
 In its General Recommendation No. 30 on Discrimination against Non-Citizens, the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination made clear that the Race Convention is in 
no way intended to shield from scrutiny racially discriminatory nationality policies. Thus, the 
General Recommendation affirmed unequivocally that “deprivation of citizenship on the basis of 
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin is a breach of States parties' obligations to 
ensure non-discriminatory enjoyment of the right to nationality.”59 States parties should “[e]nsure 
that particular groups of non-citizens are not discriminated against with regard to access to 
citizenship or naturalization, and…pay due attention to possible barriers to naturalization that 
may exist for long-term or permanent residents.”60 Finally, the General Recommendation 
suggested that States “[t]ake into consideration that in some cases denial of citizenship for long-
term or permanent residents could result in creating disadvantage for them in access to 
employment and social benefits, in violation of the Convention's anti-discrimination principles.”61 
 Other international instruments similarly prohibit racial discrimination in respect of 
nationality. The respective non-discrimination guarantees of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights—when read both independently (Article 26),62 and together with the right to 
                                                 
56 Race Convention, Article 1(3). 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid, Article 5(d)(iii). 
59 UN CERD, General Recommendation No. 30: Discrimination against Non-Citizens 01/10/2004, para. 14.  
60 Ibid., para. 13 
61 Ibid., paras. 13-15.  
62 Article 26 mandates a guarantee to all persons of “equal and effective protection against discrimination on any 
ground such as race, colour … national or social origin….” 
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nationality for children (Article 2, taken together with Article 24(2))63—prohibit racial 
discrimination against children in the right to acquire a nationality. 
 The Convention on the Rights of the Child, which, as noted above, guarantees the right of 
all children to acquire a nationality, requires that this right be “respect[ed] and ensure[d] … 
without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal 
guardian's race, colour … national, ethnic or social origin.”64  
 These guarantees of non-discrimination in access to nationality have been reinforced by 
the practice of United Nations organs in monitoring state compliance. In 1996, the CERD found 
that (then-) Zairian legislation restricting access to nationality for the Banyarwanda ethnic group 
to those who could prove that their ancestors had lived in Zaire since 1885 violated Article 
5(d)(iii) on the right to nationality of the Race Convention.65 In 1999, when examining the Syrian 
Arab Republic, the CERD underscored the need “to protect the rights of all persons belonging to 
ethnic and national groups to enjoy, without discrimination, the civil and political rights listed in 
Article 5 of the Convention, notably the right to nationality….”66 In 2001, the CERD expressed 
concern about the difficulties experienced by the Crimean Tartar minority in acquiring Ukrainian 
citizenship, and noted that the Race Convention might require revision of legislation and 
practice.67 More recently, the CERD took note of Russia’s discriminatory application of formal 
citizenship rights to the Meskhetian minority in the Krasnodar Krai region in 2003, and urged the 
government to “ensure that the Meskhetians … are given residence registration and enjoy the 
rights and benefits of citizenship.”68  
 With respect to children’s right to a nationality, the UN Human Rights Committee has 
clarified that  
States are required to adopt every appropriate measure, both 
internally and in cooperation with other States, to ensure that every 
child has a nationality when he is born. In this connection, no 
discrimination with regard to the acquisition of nationality should 
be admissible under internal law as between legitimate children and 
children born out of wedlock or of stateless parents or based on the 
nationality status of one or both of the parents.69 
 
                                                 
63 Article 2 provides that: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour … national or social origin….”  
64 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 2(1).  
65 UN CERD, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Democratic 
Republic of the Congo 27/09/96. UN Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.18, paras. 17 and 25. 
66 UN CERD, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Syrian Arab 
Republic 07/07/99, UN Doc. CERD/C/304/Add. 70, para. 14; and Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Kuwait. 15/09/93, UN Doc. A/48/18, paras. 359-381. 
67 UN CERD, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Ukraine 
16/08/2001, UN Doc. A/56/18, para. 374. 
68 UN CERD, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Russian 
Federation 21/03/2003, UN Doc. CERD/C/62/CO/7, para. 12.  
69 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 17: Rights of the Child (Article 24) 07/04/89, para. 8.  
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The Committee on the Rights of the Child has repeatedly recalled that racial 
discrimination against children in access to nationality, including the discriminatory application 
of the right to birth registration, is a violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In 
2003, the Committee, in reviewing the Syrian Arab Republic’s failure to grant nationality to 
Kurdish children, emphasized that  
[A]rticles 2 and 7 of the Convention require that all children within 
the State party’s jurisdiction have the right to be registered and 
acquire a nationality, irrespective of the child’s or his or her 
parents’ or legal guardians’ sex, race, religion or ethnic origin.70 
 
 In 2001, the Committee advised the Democratic Republic of the Congo of its concern that 
the right to nationality of certain ethnic groups was not being respected, and urged the 
government to “ensure that all children, without discrimination, are accorded a nationality….”71 
The Committee has expressed similar concerns in other cases.72  
 In 1997, a resolution of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights affirmed “the 
importance of the right to nationality of every human person as an inalienable human right,” and 
recognized “that arbitrary deprivation of nationality on racial, ethnic, or religious grounds is a 
violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”73 The resolution called upon all States “to 
refrain from taking measures and enacting legislation that discriminates against persons or groups 
of persons on grounds of race, colour or national or ethnic origin by nullifying or impairing the 
exercise, on an equal footing, of their right to nationality, and to repeal such legislation if it 
already exists.”74 
 The prohibition against racial discrimination in access to nationality has equally firm 
roots at the regional level and in national legislation. Articles 1(1) and 24 of the American 
Convention, together with Article 20, prohibit racial discrimination in the enjoyment of the right 
to a nationality. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Nationality expressly mandates that 
                                                 
70 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Syrian 
Arab Republic 10/07/2003, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.212, para. 33.  
71 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 09/07/2001, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.153, paras. 28-29.  
72 See, for example, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Bhutan, supra note 49, para. 
37  (“The Committee is concerned at violations of the right to a nationality for children whose birth has not been 
registered or for children born in the State party and whose parents are not nationals of the State party…. The 
Committee recommends that the State party examine concerns relating to the access of children to a nationality and 
make every effort to improve respect for this right. The Committee also recommends that the State party give attention 
to the situation of children whose parents are unable to claim the State party's nationality”); Concluding Observations 
of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Central African Republic 18/10/2000, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.138, 
paras. 38-39 (expressing concern that the government was violating the right to nationality for children born in the 
Central African Republic whose parents were not nationals, and recommending that the State party “examine concerns 
relating to the access of children to a nationality and make every effort to improve respect for this right. The Committee 
also recommends that the State party give attention to the situation of children whose parents are unable to claim the 
State party’s nationality”).  
73United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1997/36[1997], paras. 1 and 2.  
74 Ibid., para. 3.  
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“[t]he rules of a State party on nationality shall not contain distinctions or include any practice 
which amount to discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion, race, colour or national or ethnic 
origin.” The Council of Europe is in accord: 
It must be recognized that in general there is a consensus in the 
international community that the sovereignty of states in matters of 
nationality has some limits, as the rules laid down in internal law 
must be compatible with international law and take into account the 
interest of individuals concerned … [The Committee of Ministers] 
stresses the absolute inadmissibility of any discrimination related to 
sex, religion, race, colour or national or ethnic origin in the 
legislation on nationality and its application.75 
  
 Finally, discrimination on the basis of race and/or ethnicity in the granting or denial of 
nationality is expressly outlawed by the national legislation of numerous countries, including the 
following: 
 
• Article 4 of the Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Moldova of 2000 mandates that 
“[i]ssues of citizenship of the Republic of Moldova shall be regulated by the Constitution 
of the Republic of Moldova, the international treaties to which the Republic of Moldova 
is part, by the present law, as well as by other normative documents adopted according to 
these,” including the Race Convention, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on 
Nationality. 
• According to the Federal Law on Citizenship of the Russian Federation, rules governing 
nationality in Russia “shall not include provisions which restrict citizens' rights on the 
grounds of social or national origin, race, language or religion.”76  
• In Ukraine, nationality legislation defines citizens as “persons, irrespective of their race, 
color of their skin … ethnic and social origins …  who were residing in Ukraine at the 
moment of entry into force of the Law of Ukraine On Citizenship of Ukraine (13 
November 1991) and who were not citizens of other states.”77 
• The Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Citizenship of the Azerbaijan Republic entitles a 
foreigner or stateless person who satisfies residency and language requirements to 
citizenship, “regardless of his/her origin, social and property status, race and nationality, 
                                                 
75 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation Rec (1999)18 on the 
avoidance and reduction of statelessness (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 15 September 1999, at the 679th 
meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies).  
76 Federal Law on Citizenship of the Russian Federation (2002), Article 4(1).  
77 The Law of Ukraine on Citizenship of Ukraine, (1991) Article 3(2).  
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sex, educational background, language, religious views, political and other 
convictions.”78 
• Racial discrimination in access to nationality, which has a long history in the United 
States, was outlawed by the Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952, which 
made all races and ethnicities eligible for naturalization. Section 1422 of the Act 
mandates that “[t]he right of a person to become a naturalized citizen of the United States 
shall not be denied or abridged because of race or sex or because such person is 
married.”79  
 
 
II.  The Dominican Republic Systematically Discriminates Against Persons of Haitian 
Descent in Access to Nationality  
 
A. The situation in the Dominican Republic  
 As numerous international monitoring bodies have repeatedly noted, the Dominican 
Republic has systematically denied persons of Haitian descent access to nationality because of 
their race. As recently as 2001, the Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed concern “at 
the discrimination against children of Haitian origin born in the State party’s territory or 
belonging to Haitian migrant families … whose right to birth registration has been denied in the 
State party. As a result of this policy, those children have not been able to enjoy fully their 
rights.”80 Human Rights Watch has similarly concluded: “Dominico-Haitians are systematically 
refused proof of Dominican citizenship. The denial often begins in the hospital where they are 
born, when hospital staff refuses to provide their parents with proof of the birth. Later in their 
lives, the obstacles to obtaining proof of citizenship become even more difficult to surmount. The 
result is that many Dominicans of Haitian descent live a precarious existence, perpetually at risk 
of deportation.”81 Ethnic Haitians are thus forced into a cycle of vulnerability, with multiple 
generations lacking the proper documentation to enable them to claim their lawful nationality and 
access other fundamental human rights, including education, freedom of movement, and political 
participation.  
The Dominican Republic’s widespread prevention of the registration of children of 
Haitian descent, by blocking the issuance of birth certificates that are the principal form of proof 
                                                 
78 Article 14. 
79 Sec. 311, 66 Stat. 239 (1952), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1422. 
80 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: 
Dominican Republic 21/02/2001, CRC/C/15/Add.150 (2001), paras. 22 and 26.  
81 Human Rights Watch, ‘Illegal People’: Haitians and Dominico-Haitians in the Dominican Republic (Vol. 1, No. 
1(B) (April 2002) at 3.  
82 Ibid at 24.  
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of citizenship for both minors and adults,82 is troublesome. In carrying out a policy of systematic 
discrimination in access to nationality against Dominicans of Haitian descent, the Dominican 
Republic has violated international law and its own Constitution. The Dominican Republic’s 
discriminatory policy with respect to nationality has manifested itself in several distinct ways.  
 
B. Direct Discrimination 
 First, some government conduct reflects direct discrimination on the basis of race. Thus, 
under Dominican legislation, a birth may be registered either at the hospital where it occurs 
within twelve hours83 or at a civil registry office within thirty days.84 As the Inter-American 
Commission has noted, many hospital officials and/or civil registrars outright refuse to issue birth 
certificates to children of Haitian descent because they are black, or perceived to be black.85 
Relevant authorities often refuse to enter children of Haitian descent in the civil registry.86 There 
have been reports that civil registry officials have received orders from their superiors not to 
register or expedite birth certificates to children of Haitian descent.87  
 In addition to simply refusing to register births, some civil registry officials have engaged 
in other kinds of direct discrimination, including demanding that persons perceived to be of 
Haitian descent produce documents (in order to justify registration of births) that are neither 
requested of others nor clearly prescribed in Dominican legislation. For example, Law No. 659 of 
July 17, 1944 on Acts of Civil Status does not require that parents present their identity documents 
in order to register children. All that the law requires are the child’s medical records, including 
finger and foot prints, the mother’s name and age, and the time and date of birth.88 Nevertheless, 
ethnic Haitian parents have been illegally required to present these identity documents at many 
Civil Registries.89 Not coincidentally, most ethnic Haitians lack such documentation. Many ethnic 
Haitian parents were themselves unable to obtain a birth certificate and therefore lack the valid 
identity documents extra-legally required by the Civil Registry offices. Others are migrant 
workers and possess only Haitian government documents or no documents at all. This 
                                                 
83 Ley 136-03 Código para el Sistema de Protección y los Derechos Fundamentales de los Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes 
[Law 136-03: Code for the System of Protection and Fundamental Rights of Boys, Girls, and Adolescents], Title II, 
Chapter II, Article 4.  
84 Ley No. 659 Sobre Actos del Estado Civil of July 17, 1944 [Law No. 659 on Acts of Civil Status], Article 39. 
85 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Dominican Republic 1999, “Chapter IX: Situation of Migrant 
Workers and Their Families in the Dominican Republic,” Inter-Am. C.H.R. OEA Rev. 1 (7 October 1999) para. 352.  
86 Human Rights Watch, ‘Illegal People,’ supra note 81, at 24.  
87 Inter-American Commission “Chapter IX: Situation of Migrant Workers and Their Families in The Dominican 
Republic,” supra note 85, para. 356. 
88 Ley No. 659, supra note 84, Article 40. See also Ley 136-03, supra note 83, para. 4: “The health institutions, centers 
and services must keep a registry of all births that take place in the same, via individual medical files, where it will be 
stated, in addition to pertinent medical facts, the identification of the newborn via his or her finger and foot prints, 
name and age of the mother, and the date and time of birth, without prejudice to other methods of identification that 
may be used.”  
89 Inter-American Commission, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Chapter V(a): 
Dominican Republic,” Inter-Am. C.H.R. OEA/Ser./L/V/II.114 doc. 5 rev. 16 April 2002, para. 77. 
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discriminatory, extra-legal requirement effectively bars ethnic Haitians from registering their 
children’s births.  
 The problem of direct discrimination is exacerbated when births are not immediately 
registered. Under Dominican law, if a birth is not registered either (i) in the hospital at the time of 
birth or (ii) in the local office of the Civil Registry within 30 days of the date of birth, the Civil 
Registry reviews the application for the birth certificate and forwards the applicant’s file to a civil 
judge for review.90 The review process normally takes a few months. The birth certificate is 
issued only upon a judge’s approval. But ethnic Haitians are commonly singled out for 
discriminatory treatment at this stage of the process as well. Thus, according to Human Rights 
Watch, “civil registries generally refuse to forward applications filed by undocumented Haitian 
parents, telling the parents that it is pointless to send the application because the court will reject 
it.”91  
 
C. Indirect Discrimination 
 
 In addition to direct discrimination, children of Haitian descent are commonly subjected 
to various forms of indirect discrimination in access to nationality. In the Dominican Republic, 
there exist two different systems and sets of regulations for registering births. Registrations of 
birth up to the age of sixteen are governed by the Law on Acts of Civil Status.92 Late birth 
registrations after the age of sixteen are governed by the Junta Central Electoral’s Requirements 
for Late Birth Declaration.93 The procedure for late birth registration for those older than 16 
imposes requirements for document production which indirectly discriminate against ethnic 
Haitians. According to the Junta Central Electoral, the government institution responsible for late 
registration of births, applicants must fulfill eleven requirements in order for their birth to be 
registered. These requirements include the following:  
 
• birth certificate containing the child’s sex, date of the birth and mother’s name;  
• name of the mother and identity card numbers of the parents;  
                                                 
90 See Ley No. 659, supra note 84, Article 39. See also Ley 136-03, supra note 83, para. 3 (“In the case of boys or girls 
who were not born in a private of public [medical] center, and before the refusal of the authorities charged with 
registering the births in the Civil Registry, the mother, father or guardian, himself or via special representation, can, 
through the National Council for Childhood and Adolescence (CONAMI), and having proof of the birth, request the 
Tribunal for Boys, Girls, and Adolescents to register his or her birth in the Civil Registry.”  
91 Human Rights Watch, ‘Illegal People,’ supra note 81, at 24. See also Inter-American Commission, “Chapter IX: 
Situation of Haitian Migrant Workers and their Families,” supra note 85, paras. 75-77. 
92 Ley No. 659, supra note 84. 
93 Junta Central Electoral, Requisitos para la Declaración Tardía de Nacimientos [Requirements for Late Birth 
Declaration] (2001). 
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• certificate of registration in a public or private school, containing the most recent 
academic level and the status of the person whose birth is registered and 
indicating that no other birth certificate was previously issued;  
• evidence that the person whose birth is being registered has been issued an 
identity card, as certified by the Junta Central Electoral;  
• certification by the Civil Register office in the local judicial district where the 
child is born stating that the person making a late birth registration has not 
previously been registered in that office, when the birth is being registered in a 
different locality if there is more than one Civil Register office in the place of 
birth, each one is obliged to issue such certification; 
• sworn statement by three literate witnesses at least 50 years of age attesting to the 
birth.94 
  
 Although neutral on their face, these requirements have a disproportionately 
discriminatory effect on persons of Haitian descent. First, by virtue of some of the directly 
discriminatory patterns noted above, ethnic Haitians are disproportionately unable to produce 
certain documents on the list, such as birth certificates. Many ethnic Haitian parents possess no 
identity documents. Often they or their parents may not have brought any identity documents 
from Haiti when they arrived in the Dominican Republic. Even many families who have lived in 
the Dominican Republic for generations have been unable to obtain the “cédula,” the principal 
form of identification in the Dominican Republic, precisely because a birth certificate is a 
necessary prerequisite to acquiring one.95 Because public schools require birth certificates for 
matriculation, ethnic Haitians are often unable to enroll and obtain copies of certified school 
registrations. As a result, many ethnic Haitians are not literate.  
 Second, the requirements for both initial birth registration and late registration place a 
significant financial burden on a population widely regarded as being among the poorest in the 
country. The Inter-American Commission has repeatedly highlighted the “precarious” and 
“unhealthy” living conditions of ethnic Haitians.96 These observations have been echoed by other 
monitoring bodies, including the UN Human Rights Committee; the UN Committee for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the UN CERD.97 Many ethnic Haitians work either on 
                                                 
94 Ibid. See also UN Human Rights Committee, Follow-up State Reporting, “Chapter VII: Follow-Up to Concluding 
Observations – Dominican Republic,” UN Doc. CCPR/A/58/40 vol. I (2003). 
95 Ley No. 8-92: Ley de Cedúla [Law No. 8-92: Law on the Cédula].   
96 Inter-American Commission, “Chapter IX: Situation of Haitian Migrant Workers and their Families,” supra note 85, 
para. 80.  
97 See Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Dominican Republic 
26/04/2001 CCPR/CO/71/DOM, para. 17; UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Dominican Republic 26/08/99, 
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sugar plantations known as bateyes or in the informal/underground economic sectors, which offer 
inadequate and irregular incomes. Even if overt racism did not exist, most ethnic Haitians simply 
lack the disposable income needed to travel to all the necessary government offices throughout 
the Dominican Republic to obtain the necessary documentation.98 As a practical matter, free or 
affordable legal assistance is unavailable.  
 Furthermore, in view of the prevalence of discriminatory deportation sweeps for anyone 
who looks Haitian or lacks valid identity documents, many ethnic Haitians are afraid of traveling 
too far from their residences and/or places of employment.99 The pervasive fear of deportation 
deters many from traveling to major towns for the purposes of registering a child, collecting 
evidence for birth registration, or making sworn statements before government officials.   
 
 
 
D. Unconstitutional Policy 
 The Dominican Republic’s pattern and practice of discriminating against persons of 
Haitian descent who seek birth registration as a means of effectively proving their nationality also 
contravenes its own constitutional and legislative norms. According to Article 11 of the 
Constitution of the Dominican Republic, all persons born on Dominican territory are Dominican 
citizens except for the legitimate children of foreign diplomats residing in the country or of 
parents who are “in transit.”100 Article 9 of the Civil Code defines Dominicans as those persons 
born in the territory of the Republic, regardless of the nationality of their parents, and provides 
that Dominican citizenship can be established with a birth certificate.101 The Dominican Republic 
therefore applies the jus solis method of granting citizenship where citizenship is determined by 
birth on a country’s territory. The government has consistently affirmed that the term “in transit” 
                                                                                                                                                 
CERD/304/Add.74, para. 11; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Dominican Republic 12/1/97 E/C.12/1/Add.16, para. 17.  
98 Inter-American Commission, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Chapter V(a): 
Dominican Republic,” Inter-Am C.H.R. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.114 doc. 5 rev., 16 April 2002, para. 77 (“the cost entailed 
and the documentation problems of parents make these requirements impossible to meet”).  
99 Inter-American Commission, “Chapter IX: Situation of Haitian Migrant Workers and their Families,” supra note 85, 
para. 88 (“The Commission notes with concern that the Dominican States continues its practice of mass 
deportations….”); Human Rights Watch, ‘Illegal People,’ supra note 81, at 11 (“Snatched off the street, dragged from 
their homes, or picked up from their work-places, ‘Haitian-looking’ people are rarely given a reasonable opportunity to 
challenge their expulsion during these wholesale sweeps. The arbitrary nature of such actions, which myriad 
international human rights bodies have condemned, is glaringly obvious…Suspected undocumented migrants are 
singled out for deportation based on the color of their skin. Once in migration or military custody, they are frequently 
granted little or no opportunity to prove their legal status”).  
100 Constitution of the Dominican Republic (1994). The exact language of Article 11(1) is as follows: “Dominicans are: 
All the persons who were born on the territory of the Republic, with the exception of the legitimate children of foreign 
diplomats resident in the country or those who are transiting through it.” [“Todas las personas que nacieren en el 
territorio de la República, con excepción de los hijos legítimos de los extranjeros residentes en el país en representación 
diplomática o los que están de tránsito en él.”]  
101 Codigo Civil de la República Dominicana [Civil Code of the Dominican Republic], Article 9, para. 1.   
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is defined by Immigration Act No. 95 of April 14, 1939, and Immigration Regulation No. 279 of 
May 12, 1939, which categorize as “in transit” foreigners who try to enter the Dominican 
Republic with the principal objective of traveling to an exterior destination; business or leisure 
visitors; persons who are actively serving in foreign navy or air forces; and temporary workers 
and their families.102 The Dominican Republic has referred to this legislation before numerous 
international and regional human rights treaty bodies to explain its nationality policy, noting that 
“Aliens are defined under [Immigration] Act No. 95 of 1 June 1930 and Immigration Regulation 
No. 279, which also…[define] those who are considered to be in transit…. A period of 10 days 
will be considered ordinarily sufficient to pass through the Republic.”103 
 In spite of these clear constitutional and regulatory provisions, however, individuals of 
Haitian descent born on Dominican territory have been arbitrarily barred from accessing 
Dominican nationality. The Dominican Republic has repeatedly claimed that the parents of 
children of Haitian descent born on Dominican territory are “in transit,” even when these parents 
(and their parents) were themselves born on Dominican territory and have lived in the Dominican 
Republic for decades. As the Inter-American Commission has observed, “[i]t is not possible to 
consider persons who have resided for several years [let alone, decades] in a country in which 
they have developed innumerable contacts of all types to be in transit.”104 This is especially true 
when one considers that the timeframe for being “in transit” is only ten days.105  In its 
“breathtaking misreading of the constitution’s language,”106 the Dominican government has 
relegated persons of Haitian descent to what the Inter-American Commission has called a “status 
of permanent illegality.”107 Moreover, by implausibly attempting to justify its discriminatory 
denial of nationality as constitutionally-impelled, the Dominican government has elevated 
                                                 
102 Ley de Inmigración No. 95 del 14 de Abril de 1939 [Law No. 95 on Immigration of April 14, 1939], Article 3. The 
exact language is: “Foreigners who wish to be admitted will be Immigrants unless they fall under one of the following 
Non-Immigrant classes: 1. Visitors or business, pleasure, or curiosity trips; 2. Persons who are transiting through the 
territory of the Republic on their way to the exterior; 3. Persons who are actively serving in foreign naval or air forces; 
4. Temporary workers and their families.” The language of Acto No. 279 del 12 de Mayo del 1939 Reglamento de la 
Ley de Inmigración [Act No. 279 of May 12, 1939 on the Regulation of the Law on Immigration]  Section 5 (a) is 
similar: “Those foreigners who try to enter the Republic with the principal aim of traveling through the country en 
route to a foreign destination will be granted transitory privileges. These privileges will be granted even though the 
transient person will not be admissible as an Immigrant, so long as his entry is not damaging to public health or safety. 
The foreigner will be required to declare his destination, the transportation means used, and the date and time of his 
departure from the Republic. A period of 10 days will be considered ordinarily sufficient to transit through the 
country.” 
103 UN Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the 
Covenant: Dominican Republic 27/04/2000, UN Doc. CCPR/C/DOM/99/3, para. 65. See also UN Human Rights 
Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Dominican Republic 26/04/2000, UN Doc. 
CCPR/CO/71/DOM, para. 18; and UN Human Rights Committee, Follow-up State Reporting: Action By State Party: 
Dominican Republic, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/71/Dom/Add.1(2002), para. 57. 
104Inter-American Commission, “Chapter IX: Situation of Migrant Workers and Their Families in the Dominican 
Republic,” supra note 85, para. 353.  
105 Acto No. 279, Section 5 (a), supra note 102.  
106 Human Rights Watch, ‘Illegal People,’ supra note 81, at 23.   
107 Inter-American Commission, “Chapter IX: Situation of Migrant Workers and Their Families in the Dominican 
Republic,” supra note 85, para. 350.  
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unlawful practice to the status of official policy.108 In so doing, it has incurred the repeated 
criticism of intergovernmental monitoring organs.109  
 In sum, the policy of the Dominican Republic was—at all times relevant to the violations 
alleged in this case—to deny persons of Haitian descent access to nationality. As direct 
discrimination, government officials have routinely and systematically denied persons of Haitian 
descent access to nationality—and the birth registration documents necessary to prove it—
because of their race. As indirect discrimination, government rules concerning birth registration 
have severely disadvantaged persons of Haitian descent absent any objective and reasonable 
justification.  
  
III.  Racial Discrimination in Access to Nationality is a Global Problem 
 The instances of racial discrimination in access to citizenship at issue in this case are not 
isolated phenomena. To the contrary, government discrimination on the basis of race in granting 
access to citizenship is a problem in virtually every region of the world. Victims of discrimination 
in access to nationality are vulnerable to deportation, and frequently lack access to legal counsel. 
Accordingly, they rarely seek legal redress, and few cases have been presented to courts on their 
                                                 
108 Indicative of this policy is a statement before the UN CERD in 1999 by a government official, who uniformly 
categorized all persons of Haitian descent—even those whose families had been living in the Dominican Republic for 
generations—as “temporary workers” born of “foreigners,” and therefore not entitled to Dominican nationality (UN 
CERD, Acta Resumida de la 1365a Sesión: Dominican Republic, Latvia 01/09/99, UN Doc. CERD/C/SR.1365, para. 
17). Among the claims of this official were (i) that only those children born to foreign documented workers who could 
not pass along their nationality were entitled to Dominican nationality; (ii) that Dominican migrant law considered 
temporary workers as being “in transit” but non-immigrant; and (iii) that children born to unions between an ethnic 
Haitian and an ethnic Dominican could access their right to Dominican nationality only if the Dominican-born parent 
could produce accredited citizenship documents. These statements are not discriminatory on their face; rather, they are 
indirectly discriminatory in that they seek to group Dominican-born, ethnic Haitians who have a constitutional right to 
Dominican nationality with recently-arrived migrant workers whose right to Dominican nationality is not automatic. 
Additionally, the language used by the government official contravenes the jus solis principle enshrined in the 
Dominican constitution by restricting the category of people who can benefit from the jus solis principle. The exact 
language used by the government official before the CERD was as follows: “Not all persons born or living on 
Dominican territory have the right to nationality… A person born in the country to a foreigner who passes along his or 
her nationality is not Dominican; but he who is born in the country to a legal immigrant is Dominican if the legal 
immigrant does not pass along his original nationality. Since the immigration law considers temporary workers and 
their families Non-Immigrant or in transit, the children of Haitian workers are not Dominican, a situation fully in line 
with paragraph 3 of the Convention.” In another forum on a separate occasion, a government official stated, contrary to 
Dominican and international law, “If the parents are illegal, so is the child, even if said child is born here.” See Inter-
American Commission, Chapter V: Situation of Haitians in the Dominican Republic, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.81 Doc 6 rev. 1 (14 February 1992).   
109 See United Nations Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: 
Dominican Republic 26/04/2000 UN Doc. CCPR/CO/71/DOM, para. 18 (expressing concern at “the abuse of the legal 
notion of ‘transient’ aliens’….[S]uch persons may be born in the Dominican Republic to parents who were born there 
but are still not considered to be nationals of the Dominican Republic”); UN Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and  Cultural Rights: Dominican 
Republic 12/12/97, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.16, para. 17 (“the Committee is particularly concerned about the situation 
of children who, due to the restrictive interpretation of article 11 of the Constitution by the authorities, do not receive 
Dominican nationality on the grounds that they are children of foreigners born in transit”); Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, “Chapter IX: Situation of Migrant Workers and Their Families in the Dominican Republic,” supra 
note 85, para. 363. (“It is not possible to consider persons who have resided for years in a country in which they have 
developed innumerable contacts of all types to be in transit. Consequently, numerous children of Haitian origin are 
denied fundamental rights, such as the right to nationality of the country of birth, access to health care, and access to 
education”).     
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behalf. This case provides an unprecedented opportunity for a judicial body with the prestige and 
authority of this Court to address this important question from the perspective of international 
human rights law. Following are several examples of racial discrimination in access to 
nationality: 
 
• The Rohingya Muslim minority of Burma is one such ethnic group. Although nearly all 
Rohingya or their parents were born in the northern Ankara state of Burma, have resided 
there, and have family there, the government refuses to recognize them as citizens, 
categorizing them instead as “illegal migrants.” The 1983 Burmese Citizenship Act 
established three hierarchical categories of citizenship—full citizenship, associate 
citizenship, and naturalized citizenship110—from which the Rohingya are effectively 
excluded. The government claims that the Rohingya are ineligible for citizenship because 
they (a) are not considered a national ethnic group as provided by Section 3 of the 1982 
citizenship law and thus cannot be considered as full citizens; (b) they were not eligible 
for citizenship under the 1948, and had not applied for citizenship under that act, and thus 
are not eligible for associate citizenship; and (c) few among them possess the requisite 
documentation that provides conclusive evidence of entry and residence prior to January 
1948.111 The government’s interpretation of the ostensibly race-neutral citizenship laws 
has rendered the Rohingya ethnic group potentially stateless, as no other state recognizes 
them as nationals. Marked as foreigners by the Burmese government, the Rohingya suffer 
from restricted freedom of movement, limited access to secondary education and 
employment, forced labor, and arbitrary confiscation of their property. Moreover, the 
1982 law denies citizenship to children born to non-citizens, thereby perpetuating the 
citizenship crisis among future generations of Rohingya.112 
 
• A similar situation affects the Meskhetian minority in the Russian Federation. As 
nationals of the former Soviet Union, the Meskhetians were entitled to acquire citizenship 
of the Russian Federation under the 1991 Citizenship Law. Article 13(1) of the law 
provided that former Soviet citizens permanently residing in the Russian Federation on 
the date the law entered into force and who did not decline their Russian citizenship 
within a year were deemed Russian citizens. Despite the fact that the Meskhetians were 
                                                 
110 Full citizenship is granted to those whose parents were both citizens; associate citizenship (not defined in the 1982 
law, but under the 1948 Union Citizenship Act) is granted to those whose ancestors settled in Burma after 1823, 
naturalized citizenship is granted to those for whom at least one parent was a citizen and the other a foreigner, or where 
one parent was an associate citizen and the other a naturalized citizens, or where both parents are naturalized citizens, 
or where one parent was a naturalized citizen and the other a foreigner.   
111 Amnesty International, The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied (May 2004).  
112 Human Rights Watch, Living in Limbo: Burmese Rohingya in Malaysia (August 2000, Vol. 12 No. 4 (C)).  
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permanent residents of the Russian Federation and had not declined Russian citizenship, 
local administrative authorities denied them equal access to citizenship under the federal 
law of the Russian Federation. Officials in the Krasnodar Krai region, where most 
Meskhetians reside, have passed legislation effectively denying Meskhetians access to 
permanent residence registration on the pretext that they are “stateless,” and conceded 
only temporary residence permits of 3 months. This discriminatory use of the registration 
requirement is used to sever the connection between citizenship and the protection of 
rights, as legal residence registration serves as the basis for access to protection by the 
state. 
 
• The Nubian community of Kenya is composed of more than 100,000 descendants of 
persons originally from the territory of Sudan who were brought to East Africa as forced 
conscripts by the British colonial government and resettled in various regions of modern-
day Kenya over 100 years ago. “Although the Nubians should be considered as Kenyan 
citizens under the prevailing laws, the overwhelming majority of them live as de facto 
stateless persons without adequate legal protection. They are systematically denied their 
right to Kenyan citizenship and to own land.”113 When seeking to assert their right to 
Kenyan citizenship, Nubians have been requested to produce their grandparents’ birth 
certificates, which are almost impossible to obtain for the majority of Nubians today, as 
many of their grandparents were born before Kenya began issuing birth certificates. 
Despite having lived in the territory for more than 100 years, before the modern Kenyan 
state even came into being, the Nubians are treated as “Kenyans of foreign extraction” 
and are thus subject to additional documentation requirements than those Kenyans 
considered to be natural citizens. Treated as non-citizens, and bereft of official 
recognition as a distinct Kenyan community with a unique culture, language, history, and 
religion, Kenyan Nubians are prevented from owning land and suffer violations of many 
fundamental human rights.114 
 
• Thailand’s Hill Tribe People, who include members of more than 13 different ethnic 
communities, number over one million. Despite being born in Thai territory, almost half 
of the Hill Tribe people lack Thai citizenship, and are thus unable to vote, buy land, seek 
                                                 
113 African Society of International and Comparative Law and Minority Rights Group International, Joint Oral 
Intervention at UN Commission on Human Rights 59th Session ” (2003).   
 
114 K. Singo’ei, “Meet the Nubians, Kenya’s Fifth-Generation ‘Foreigners,’” East Africa Magazine (July 15, 2002).  
See also United Nations Information Service, Commission on Human Rights Hears from NGOs Charging Violations 
Around the World,  UN Doc. HR/CN/1017 (April 4, 2003); and Constitution of Kenya Review Committee, 
Constituency Committee Reports : Kitutu Chache Constituency, “Section 5.3.4: Citizenship.”  
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legal employment, or travel freely. Population registration regulations passed in 1956–
from which many Thai people’s claims to citizenship derives–effectively excluded those 
communities living in remote regions, namely that Hill Tribe people, and created doubt 
about their lawful claim to Thai nationality. In the 1990s, the Thai authorities passed a 
succession of amendments to the nationality laws that, among other things, required the 
ability to speak Thai in order to be granted nationality–indirectly discriminating against 
the ethnically differentiated Hill Tribe communities who spoke their own languages. 
These communities faced additional hurdles in complying with the bureaucratic 
nationality requirements, such as providing certificates and other documents.115 Officials 
have maligned the Hill Tribe people as drug dealers, environmental criminals, national 
security threats, and illiterate and uncivilized “foreigners.”  
 
• The Kuwaiti government applies the classification “Bidun” to several groups of 
individuals, including descendants from nomadic groups and migrants who have lived in 
Kuwait for decades and have therefore lost all effective links with their ancestral homes. 
Kuwait’s Nationality Law creates a category of "original Kuwaiti nationals" who are, by 
virtue of that status, eligible for automatic nationality, resulting in a higher level of rights 
and protections under Kuwaiti law. “Original Kuwaiti nationals” are “persons who were 
settled in Kuwait prior to 1920 and who maintained their normal residence there until the 
date of the publication of the law [May 21, 1959].” The Bidun are among those unable to 
meet these requirements and have thus been denied automatic nationality. All children of 
Bidun parents are also considered Bidun, including the children of Kuwaiti mothers and 
Bidun fathers. Until the mid-1980s, even though they were denied automatic nationality, 
the Bidun were treated as lawful residents of Kuwait whose claims for citizenship were 
under consideration. In 1985, the government began applying the provisions of the Alien 
Residence Law 7/1959 to the Bidun and subsequently issued a series of regulations 
stripping them of almost all their previous rights and benefits. Commencing in 1986, the 
government restricted Biduns’ eligibility for travel documents and fired all Bidun 
government employees (except for those employed by the police or the military) who 
could not provide valid passports; private employers were required to pursue the same 
policy. In 1987, the government began to refuse Bidun registration for automobiles and 
                                                 
115 Chayan Vaddhanaphuti and Karan Aquino, Citizenship and Forest Policy in the North of Ireland (Paper presented at 
a special roundtable on Citizenship and Forest Policy at the 7th International Thai Studies Conference “Thailand: Civil 
Society?” in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, July 6, 1999), at 1. See also Marwaan Macan-Markar, “Thailand: Fear of 
Expulsion Haunts Hill Tribes,” Asia Times (30 July 2003); Yindee Lertcharoenchok, “Searching for Identity,” Step-by-
Step (Newsletter from the UN Inter-Agency Project on Trafficking in Women and Children in the Mekong Sub-Region), 
Fourth Quarter, Issue 5 (2001); and “The Struggle for the Highlands Accused of endangering the environment, 
Thailand's tribespeople face eviction and an uncertain future,” Asiaweek Vol. 25 No. 43 (October 29, 1999).  
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applications for drivers’ licenses, severely restricting their freedom of movement. That 
same year, Bidun children were barred from attending public schools. In 1998, this ban 
was extended to the university level. The government has also instructed all private clubs 
and associations to dismiss any Bidun members.116 
 
• The Banyamulenge are a Kinyarwanda-speaking ethnic group many of whose members 
have resided in the northeastern corner of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, 
formerly Zaire) since before the creation of colonial boundaries. Although the 
Banyamulenge were considered citizens under previous constitutions and law, they were 
deprived of their nationality in 1981, when the Zairian government limited citizenship to 
those individuals who could prove that their ancestors belonged to an ethnic group 
“known to exist” within the border of the territory later known as Zaire. This change in 
citizenship laws affected more than 1.5 million Banyamulenge, who were no longer 
automatically recognized as Zairians; in principle, they had to formally apply and be 
granted citizenship. Although this law was not actively enforced during the 1980s, it 
represented an official discriminatory stance toward the Banyamulenge that would only 
harden in the next two decades. Following the sharp influx of Rwandan refugees to the 
DRC after the 1994 genocide, the leaders of other ethnic groups increasingly challenged 
the rights of Banyamulenge to Congolese citizenship. On April 28, 1995, the parliament 
passed a law preventing these recent arrivals from claiming citizenship, and further 
defining the entire Banyamulenge ethnic group as “immigrants who have acquired 
Zairian nationality fraudulently” – forbidding them to sell or trade any assets and barred 
them from political and military office. In 1998, a draft constitution once again stripped 
most Banyamulenge of citizenship. Violations of the rights of Banyamulenge are seen as 
a pivotal factor in sparking the civil war that embroiled the country and region.117 
 
• Over 100,000 Bhutanese of ethnic Nepali origin were arbitrarily deprived of their 
nationality and forcibly expelled from Bhutan in the early 1990s in clear violation of 
international law. The Bhutanese government stripped southern Bhutanese of their 
citizenship in order to expel and exclude an unpopular ethnic and religious minority 
                                                 
116 See Human Rights Watch, Kuwait: Promises Betrayed: Denial of Rights of Bidun, Women, and Freedom of 
Expression (Volume 12, Number 2(E) October 2000); Human Rights Watch, The Bedoons of Kuwait: “Citizens 
Without Citizenship,” (August 1995); and United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices – 2003: Kuwait (released February 25, 2004). 
117 Jeremy Sarkin, Toward Finding a Solution for the Problems Created by the Politics of identity in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC): Designing a Constitutional Framework for Peaceful Cooperation (presented at a 
workshop titled “Politics of Identity and Exclusion in Africa: From Violent Confrontation to Peaceful Cooperation,” 
University of Pretoria, 25-26 July 2001).  
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(Hindus who are ethnically and culturally distinct from the majority ethnic group and 
ruling elite, the Buddhist Ngalongs). In 1977 and 1985, Bhutan introduced two new 
Citizenship Acts that narrowed the requirements for nationality in such a way that the 
northern Bhutanese were effectively barred access.118 In particular, these Acts 
retroactively made 1958 the cut-off year for determining citizenship. In order to be 
granted citizenship, it was now necessary to produce land tax receipts or other proof of 
residency in Bhutan dating from on or before December 31, 1958—a requirement most 
ethnic Nepali Bhutanese found hard to fulfill, given how removed they were from the 
mainstream Bhutanese society and bureaucracy.119 
 
Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Justice Initiative respectfully submits that this Court 
should find that Articles 1(1) and 24 of the American Convention, taken together with Article 
20(1), prohibit racial discrimination in access to nationality, and that the Dominican Republic’s 
policy of systematically targeting a particular ethnic group with both direct and indirect 
discrimination in access to nationality violates those provisions.  
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118 Among these requirements were twenty years of residency in the country, the ability to read, write and speak 
Dzonkha (the national language) fluently, good knowledge of the history and culture of Bhutan, a good moral 
character, and “no record of having spoken or acted against the King, country, and people of Bhutan in any manner 
whatsoever.” 
119 Among United Nations organs, see, e.g., the UN Human Rights Committee, Brooks v. The Netherlands 
Communication No. 172/1984, UN Doc. CCPR/C/29/D/172/1984, paras. 12.3 - 16 (finding violation of ICCPR Article 
26 on grounds of sex discrimination, even though State party had not intended to discriminate against women); 
Simunek et al. v. Czech Republic, supra note 14, para. 11.7 (“the intent of the legislature is not alone dispositive in 
determining a breach of article 26 of the Covenant. A politically motivated differentiation is unlikely to be compatible 
with article 26. But an act which is not politically motivated may still contravene article 26 if its effects are 
discriminatory”); Althammer v. Austria, supra note 14, para. 10.2 (employing similar reasoning); UN CERD, General 
Recommendation No. 19: Racial segregation and apartheid (Art. 3) 18/08/95, para. 3 (“condition of [unlawful] partial 
segregation may also arise as an unintended by-product of the actions of private persons”). The principle is well-
established in Europe as well. See Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, supra note 19, para. 154. 
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